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Introduction
• Poverty has a multidimensional nature. 
• Individuals with the same income may suffer different deprivation levels:
• effects of accumulated resources, educational level, housing ownership, … 
• Several proposals in the literature to measure the level of multidimensional 
deprivation: Nolan and Whelan, 1996, 2010; Atkinson et al., 2002; Atkinson, 
2003; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 
2006; Ayala et al., 2011; Ravallion, 2011; Chzhen et al., 2016; among others. 
Introduction
• Since the family involves an intra-household scheme of exchange and 
distribution of resources, different financial regimes within the household 
may, to some extent, explain the presence of specific types and levels of 
deprivation
• Empirical evidence suggesting:
• Individuals may have different preferences and may not pool their incomes (Fortin and 
Lacroix, 1997; Clark et al., 2002; Ward-Batts, 2008; Dietrich, 2008; Cherchye et al., 2009
• Decision-making process in a family exerts and important influence on the intra-
household dynamics and welfare of the household (Sundari, 2013)
Introduction
Aim:
• This paper contributes to the literature in the fields of deprivation and 
household economics by analyzing the impact of different household 
financial regimes on deprivation in a number of European countries. 
• Special module on intra-household sharing of resources included in the 2010 
wave of the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) dataset.
Introduction
• Interest of the topic:
• It answers the call reflected at the European level by the National Action 
Plans for Social Inclusion to analyze material deprivation and social 
exclusion in depth .
• If different family arrangements in terms of intrahousehold resource 
allocation and decision-making translate into different levels of 
household deprivation, those should be be taken into consideration in 
designing focalized social programs targeted at reducing social 
inequalities
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Literature review
A large number of studies focused on the measurement of deprivation and its 
determinants at both the macro and micro level:
• Individual or household characteristics (for an excellent review see Boarini
and D’Ercole, 2006).
• Cross-national differences in deprivation (see, for example, Layte et al., 
2001a, 2001b; Muffels and Fouarge, 2004; Figari, 2012; Dewilde, 2008; 
Bradshaw and Chzhen, 2012; and Bárcena-Martín et al., 2014).
Literature review
Individual and household determinants
• Negative and weak relationship with income
• Families with dependent children are especially vulnerable to material deprivation
• No clear relationship with age (if any U-shaped)
• Higher education reduces deprivation
• Households with one or more self-employed or employed workers generally present lower 
deprivation scores.
Literature review
• These studies relied on the assumption that family members act as if they 
maximize a single utility function (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1981), and thus 
ignored the potential for unequal power and resource distribution within 
households.
• Recent empirical studies suggest that the unitary approach is not always 
supported and that significant inequalities might exist within the same 
family (see, for instance, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Clark et al., 2002 and 
Ward-Batts, 2008; Dietrich, 2008 for China; Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen, 2005; 
among others)
Literature review
• New literature based on non-unitary models (mainly collective models)
• Each household member is characterized by his or her own utility 
function. 
• Decisions are seen as the outcome of some bargaining process 
(Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992; Chiappori, 1992, 1997). 
• An important distinction has been made between responsibility for the 
management of household resources and control of (major) household 
decisions (Pahl, 1989; Wilson, 1987)
Literature review
• New literature based on non-unitary models (mainly collective models)
• Evidence of gender differences concerning decision-making power and responsibility 
within the household (Mader and Schneebaum, 2013 )
• The smaller the differences in education, income, and employment status between the 
members of the couple, and the presence of children the more likely it is that decisions will 
be taken together
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Data
• The 2010 module on intra-household sharing of resources of the EUSILC.
• Sample: heterosexual couples, with or without children, for 24 countries.
• We eliminate couples with inconsistent responses on the decision-making
variables.
• We end up with 84,269 observations.
Deprivation
• Di : Deprivation Index (Items) (Guio et al., 2009)
• Economic strain: to keep home adequately warm; to afford paying for one-week 
annual holiday away from home; to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish every second 
day; to face unexpected financial expenses.
• Durables: to have a telephone; a color TV; a computer; a washing machine; a personal 
car.
• Housing: to have leaking roof/damp walls/floors/foundation or rot in window frames; 
no bath/shower; no indoor flushing toilet for sole use of the household.
• Di : Deprivation Index (Aggregation)
for each item we define a dichotomous indicator Iij:
and deprivation level is:
that equals 0 if a person lacks no items and increases with the number of items the individual 
lacks.
 
,....,Jj,...,N;ifor
abilitynon afford
ity       affordabil
Iij 111
0
==



=
 
∑
=
=
J
j
ijji IwD
1
Deprivation
Deprivation
• Mean levels of deprivation
Country Overall Deprivation Index
CH 0,025
LU 0,036
DE 0,045
BE 0,046
FR 0,047
UK 0,048
AT 0,049
IE 0,062
MT 0,064
ES 0,066
CZ 0,067
IT 0,069
EL 0,079
SK 0,079
PT 0,084
CY 0,09
HR 0,091
EE 0,095
PL 0,096
HU 0,113
LT 0,131
LV 0,154
BG 0,194
RO 0,21
TOTAL 0,072
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The Model
• Zi : Socioeconomic variables
• Income: household annual equivalent disposable income
• Child: dummy to identify the presence of children
• Dual: both members of the couple are working either full or part time 
• H_Young: when the mean age of the couple is less than 35
• H_Middle: when the mean age of the couple is from 35 to 65
• H_Old (reference category) 
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The Model
• Zi : Socioeconomic variables
• H_Tertiary and H_Secondary : 0 if None of the household members have tertiary education or 
secondary education;  1 if only one of them has attained a tertiary or secondary education 
respectively; and 2 if both members of the couple have attained a tertiary or secondary level of 
education.
• H_Chronic: number of household members suffering from chronic diseases.
• H-Marital: dummy for legal consensual unions
 
iiD εγγγγ ++++= 3210 'i'i'i CZW
The Model
• Ci : Country specific fixed effects
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The Model
• Wi : Financial Regimen
Income pooling: How are the incomes you receive in your household dealt
with?
• Reg1 if the answer is that all incomes are treated as common resources
• Reg2 if the answer is that not all incomes are treated as common resources
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The Model
• Wi : Financial Regimen
Financial decision-making: "Who in your couple is generally more likely to 
take decisions on" in five areas: i) shopping; ii) children expenses; iii) furniture, 
etc.; iv) borrowing; v) saving
• Dec_f if females have most decision-making responsibilities
• Dec_m if males have most decision-making responsibilities
• Dec_s if decisions are shared
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The Model
• Wi : Financial Regimen
Financial decision-making:
Watson et al. (2013): 
• The average across the items that range from 0 (responsibility for decision making in none 
of the areas) to 10 (responsibility for decision making in all areas). 
• A score from 4 to 6           shared responsibility 
• adults are jointly responsible for each of the areas 
• an almost even division of responsibilities between them (e.g., one is responsible for shopping 
and the other is responsible for decisions on savings).
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The Model
Wi : Financial Regimen
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Variable Description Mean values
Reg1_DecS All income pooling and decisions shared (Reference) 41,66%
Reg1_DecF All income pooling and decisions mainly female 31,58%
Reg1_DecM All income pooling and decisions mainly male 5,42%
Reg2_DecS Not All income pooling and decisions shared 9,46%
Reg2_DecF Not All income pooling and decisions mainly female 9,74%
Reg2_DecM Not All income pooling and decisions mainly male 2,15%
The Model
Linear model. Cluster robust standard errors
Wi : Financial Regimen Endogeneity problem
Deb and Trivedi (2006) : Two set of equations: 
Choice of financial regime (selection) 
 Intensity of deprivation (outcome). 
(The selection and the outcome equations are linked via observed and unobserved characteristics).
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The Model
Deb and Trivedi (2006) :
Selection equation
• multinomial choice model for the household financial regimen
(selection)
• Let  denote the indirect utility associated with the jth choice (j=1,…J)
• Xi includes the exogenous variables plus the instruments
• ηij are i.i.d. error terms 
• mik, incorporate unobserved characteristics common to deprivation and household decisions regarding 
the financial regimen (independent of ηij)
Uij*
Uij* = X i' β j + ϕ jkmik
k=1
J
∑ +ηij
The Model
Deb and Trivedi (2006) :
Selection equation
• Let bj be the binary variables representing the observed choices and   
• The probability of any type of financial regime can be represented as:
where g is a multinomial probability distribution 
Some restrictions are imposed: each choice is affected by a unique latent factor
bi = bi1, bi 2,..., biJ[ ]
Pr(bi X i,M i ) = g X i' β1 + ϕ1kmik
k=1
J
∑ , X i' β2 + ϕ2kmik
k=1
J
∑ ,    ...  , X i' βJ + ϕJkmik
k=1
J
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The Model
Deb and Trivedi (2006) :
Outcome equation
Where:
• is the set of exogenous covariates
• denotes the selection effects relative to the control
Di = γ0 + δ jbij
j=1
J
∑ + λ jmij
j=1
J
∑ + Z i'γ2 +Ci'γ3 +εi
Z i
δ j
Results
Validity of instruments
• Instruments:  variables that measure within-household inequalities concerning education 
and income (following Vogler (1994), Lyngstad et al. (2011), and Mader and Schneebaum
(2013)). 
• Income_F and Income_M: Dummies to capture female or male earning more income than her/his 
partner 
• Education_F and Education_M: Dummies to capture female or male with higher level of 
education than her/his partner
• They have useful predictive power and hence are relevant. 
• We test for the exogeneity of the financial regimes, and they are not exogenous. 
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Results
When couple members  keep part 
of their incomes  separately, the 
worse situation is that in which 
decision making is shared
Results
when looking at households that 
pool all incomes, deprivation is
especially higher when males 
take most decisions
Results
How much extra income would have to be given to the household to exactly 
compensate for a specific financial regime other than the reference category in 
terms of deprivation? 
Reg1_DecS Reg2_DecS: the negative effect in terms of deprivation could be offset 
by a 129 percent increase in own household income (for the sample average income, 
this variation amounts to €23,504)
Results
How much extra income would have to be given to the household to exactly 
compensate for a specific financial regime other than the reference category in 
terms of deprivation?
Reg1_DecS Reg1_DecF: the negative effect in terms of deprivation could be offset 
by a 16.47 percent increase in own household income (for the sample average 
income, this variation amounts to €2,992)
Reg1_DecS Reg1_DecM: the negative effect in terms of deprivation could be 
offset by a 33.39 percent increase in own household income (for the sample average 
income, this variation amounts to €6,063)
Conclusions
Interesting insight on the role that income pooling and decision making 
within the household play in determining material deprivation
Pooling all incomes and sharing decisions, once controlling for the effects of 
other socio-economic determinants, is associated with lower levels of 
deprivation. 
When not all income are pooled, the financial regimen where females have 
most decision responsibilities is associated with similar low levels of 
deprivation.
Conclusions
The worst situation in terms of household deprivation is that in which
couple members keep part of their incomes separately and decisions are 
shared.
• As far as possible, it is crucial to take into account the pooling decisions as 
well as the decision-making processes and power relations within the 
family in designing policies to reduce deprivation. 
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